Eastern Partnership Reality Check. The case of Moldova and Georgia

Following the latest dynamic events, this article explores the European perspectives of Moldova and Georgia – countries which, so far, progress the most since the Eastern Partnership platform has been introduced. (PDF) Kristina Bocková, Marek Lenč, Slovakia

The Ukraine Crisis: Repercussions on Georgia

With a tradition of friendly and strategic relations between Tbilisi and Kyiv, Georgians see the struggle for Ukrainian sovereignty as an analogue of their own fate. This article provides some insights and policy perspective from Georgia on the ongoing crisis in Ukraine and its impact on Georgian foreign policy and internal stability. (PDF) Kornely Kakachia, Tbilisi

Role of the OSCE in handling crisis in Ukraine: Moscow’s vision

The Russian Federation continues to use intensively the OSCE potential in order to achieve its goals in Ukraine. Available OSCE experience, gained in doing its “business as usual” crisis management activity mainly oriented at “freezing” conflicts, meets the strategic intentions of the Kremlin. (PDF) Oleksandr Tytarchuk  

Draft National Security Strategy of Ukraine: an initial overview

The new draft National Security Strategy of Ukraine reflects the general trend of uncertainty in the search for effective ways to strengthen national security on the backdrop of current crisis and needs further elaboration. (PDF) Oleksandr Tytarchuk    

Minsk II Agreement: a Tactical Compromise with the Strategic Options Being Open

Although the new Minsk agreement of 12 February is more favorable for Russia than the previous one, it indicates the need for the compromise of all the negotiation parties. Neither Ukraine nor Russia was totally satisfied with the document, but both of them had strong reasons to agree on it. Germany and France had their own considerations to actively promote the agreement, even without being confident in its full implementation. (PDF) Maksym Khylko  

Мінська угода – 2: тактичний компроміс за умов стратегічної невизначеності

Нова мінська угода від 12 лютого 2015 р. більш вигідна для Росії, аніж попередня, втім її підписання вказує на потребу в компромісі всіх учасників переговорів. Ні Україна, ні Росія не були цілком задоволені документом, але мали вагомі причини погодитися на нього. Німеччина та Франція мали власні мотиви активно сприяти укладанню угоди, попри відсутність впевненості в її імплементації. (PDF)