Strengthening the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine: a way to peacekeeping?

Given the current developments, a general tendency could be revealed for more active use of the potential of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine for maintaining peace and security in Eastern Ukraine with gradual transformation into a kind of peacekeeping mission, albeit not formally recognized one. (PDF) Oleksandr Tytarchuk

“A fresh look” from Ukraine at German Foreign Policy Priorities

In this particular article, additional attempts have been made to briefly analyze the priorities of modern German foreign policy from the standpoint of Ukraine as a country representing the most recently troubled Eastern Partnership area. (PDF) Oleksandr Tytarchuk, Kyiv

The Ukraine Crisis: Repercussions on Georgia

With a tradition of friendly and strategic relations between Tbilisi and Kyiv, Georgians see the struggle for Ukrainian sovereignty as an analogue of their own fate. This article provides some insights and policy perspective from Georgia on the ongoing crisis in Ukraine and its impact on Georgian foreign policy and internal stability. (PDF) Kornely Kakachia, Tbilisi

Minsk II Agreement: a Tactical Compromise with the Strategic Options Being Open

Although the new Minsk agreement of 12 February is more favorable for Russia than the previous one, it indicates the need for the compromise of all the negotiation parties. Neither Ukraine nor Russia was totally satisfied with the document, but both of them had strong reasons to agree on it. Germany and France had their own considerations to actively promote the agreement, even without being confident in its full implementation. (PDF) Maksym Khylko  

Мінська угода – 2: тактичний компроміс за умов стратегічної невизначеності

Нова мінська угода від 12 лютого 2015 р. більш вигідна для Росії, аніж попередня, втім її підписання вказує на потребу в компромісі всіх учасників переговорів. Ні Україна, ні Росія не були цілком задоволені документом, але мали вагомі причини погодитися на нього. Німеччина та Франція мали власні мотиви активно сприяти укладанню угоди, попри відсутність впевненості в її імплементації. (PDF)