



Human Security and Security Sector Reform in Eastern Europe

Maksym Khylo, Oleksandr Tytarchuk (eds.)

June, 2017

STUDY

- Human security and security sector reform: experience of Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, Lithuania, and Slovakia. Best practices, common problems, and important lessons learned.
- Though the traditional threats are still vital, the human security paradigm placing people at the centre should be a hallmark for the security sector reforms in countries that have chosen a modern democratic model of development.
- In democratic societies, human security and state security are interconnected components that complement each other. Only those societies can be resilient, where people are properly protected from the entire range of threats, and where human security is guaranteed in its modern and inclusive sense.

Contents

Human Security: World's Practices and Ukraine's Perspective 5
Maksym Khylyko, Oleksandr Tytarchuk, East European Security Research Initiative Foundation, Ukraine

Human Security vs. National Security 14
Natalya Belitser, Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy, Ukraine

Human Security – Important Element for Democracy Building in Armenia 24
Hasmik Grigoryan, Stepan Grigoryan, Analytical Centre on Globalization and Regional Cooperation, Armenia

Human Security and Security Sector Reform in Georgia: A Critical Reflection 31
Bidzina Lebanidze, Georgian Institute of Politics

Political Security as one of the Main Conditions for Human Security
in Moldova. 36
Ion Manole, Promo-LEX Association, Moldova

Rights and Security of a Person in Belarus. 42
Andrei Porotnikov, Belarus Security Blog

Assessing the Essential Elements for Democratic Control of Armed Forces in
Lithuania 48
Grazvydas Jasutis, General Jonas Zemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania

Human Dimension and Security Sector Reform in Slovakia: Mission
(In)complete? 56
Samuel Goda, Slovak Foreign Policy Association

Human Security: World's Practices and Ukraine's Perspective

Maksym Khylyk, Oleksandr Tytarchuk, East European Security Research Initiative Foundation, Ukraine

Transition from state to human security

A new concept of human security, "which equates security with people rather than territories, with development rather than arms" and "seeks to deal with these concerns through a new paradigm of sustainable human development," was introduced in the 1994 *Human Development Report* by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).¹ Though the idea of equal importance of two major security components – freedom from fear and freedom from want – was declared from the very beginning of the United Nations Organisation, but for a long time the first component (hard security) dominated over the second one (soft security).

Among the main reasons for reconsidering the security paradigm in early 1990s was a globalisation of the threats to human security, such as drugs, AIDS, terrorism, pollution, nuclear proliferation, global poverty and environmental problems. Though one can argue that the authors of the Report were too optimistic about the decreasing of the threats to the countries' borders, but they were certainly right that "the world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives."² Being inspired with the end of "Cold War" and believing that a threat of nuclear holocaust became less actual, the UNDP called for the "profound transition in thinking from nuclear security to human security", from the narrow interpretation of security as security of territory from external aggression, to a wide people-centred interpretation of human security that "is not a concern with

weapons – it is a concern with human life and dignity".³

Being based on a multi-sectoral understanding of insecurities, human security entails a broadened understanding of threats and includes causes of insecurity relating to economic security (such threats as poverty and unemployment), food security (hunger, famine), health security (deadly infectious diseases, lack of access to basic health care), environmental security (environmental degradation, resource depletion, natural disasters, pollution), personal security (physical violence, war, crime, terrorism, domestic violence, child abuse), community security (inter-ethnic, religious and other identity based tensions) and political security (political repression, human rights violations).

Refocusing from state to human security was not an easy task even for the Western democratic countries – the corresponding gradual transition in threats perception, security priorities and instruments was reflected in NATO strategic concepts of 1991, 1999 and 2010, paying more and more attention to the non-military components of security and cooperation with the partner countries. The Central European nations of the former Warsaw Pact and the Baltic nations of the former USSR faced even more complicated transformation tasks, starting from the changes in the way of thinking and to the core of their security systems, sometimes rebuilding security bodies from the ground up.⁴ Establishment of the Partnership for Peace cooperation contributed much both for the gradual rapprochement between former adversaries, and to the assistance in security sector reforms in the post-socialist countries.

First attempts to reform post-Soviet security sector in Ukraine

After collapse of the USSR, Ukraine inherited not only the enormous military machine, but also the

1. United Nations Development Programme (1994), *Human Development Report*, Oxford University Press, New York, 226 p., available at: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-report-1994>.

2. *Ibid*, p.1-2.

3. *Ibid*, p.22.

4. E.g., see: Pyrozhev, S. & Fluri, P. (Ed.) (2004), *Security Sector Reform in Ukraine: Proceedings of the International Conference* (Kyiv, 27-28 May 2004), National Institute for International Security Problems, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Kyiv, 318 p.

totalitarian structure of the security sector and post-Soviet vision of security that was focused on protection of state and considered humans rather as material than a value. Security sector reform in Ukraine was a part of the wide process of statehood building and democratization, which was performed under the conditions of acute economic crisis, by politicians who lacked corresponding experience and often were corrupted.

In 1991, the priority task for Ukraine was to gain effective control over about 800,000-strong army inherited from the disintegrated super-power, as well as over post-Soviet security services, border guard system, police, etc. In accordance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe ratified by Ukrainian Parliament in June 1992, Kyiv took obligations to significantly reduce its heavy military equipment. The world's third nuclear armament was another top priority issue: in 1994, Kyiv accessed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Amid permanent political instability, economic crises and underfunding of the security sector, the process of post-Soviet security system reforming and modernisation was primarily driven by attempts to make its maintenance less expensive. The issues of civil control over security sector and human security were not considered seriously by the government, as well as by the common people whose top priority was physical surveillance amid poor living standards and high crime rates.

In the first decade of XXI century, when Ukrainian economy began to recover after economic crisis, attempts to reform the security sector towards enhancing civil security were taken. Presidential Decree on transforming the Internal military forces of the Ministry of internal affairs into non-military formation with more civil security functions was signed in 2003; Program of developing partnerships between police and population for 2000-2005 was adopted; the Public Council under the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine as an advisory body was established in 2004. In 2005-2009, under the President Victor Yuschenko, several conceptual documents on reforming security sector were

elaborated in cooperation with Western partners. Although the majority of reforms failed to be duly implemented, but in general the level of economic, political and personal security increased. During the presidency of Victor Yanukovich (2010-2014), security sector was refocused back on protecting governmental machine and the level of civil control was significantly decreased.

Thus, by the beginning of Russian military actions in the Crimea peninsular and the Donbas region in 2014, Ukraine was in the bottom of the European countries' lists by such important human security indicators as standard of living, level of income, share of household budget for food, environmental problems, spread of HIV/AIDS and other diseases, level of crime and corruption, protection against state repression and political detention, etc.

Human security in security sector reform under the war condition

Under the war condition, there is a temptation to postpone the human security issues to "better times" and to focus only on traditional security – from the threats to territorial integrity, independence to threats of deaths caused by war. However, it would be incorrect to consider human security as a kind of counterweight that limits state security. In democratic societies, human security and state security are interconnected components. As co-chairperson of UN Human Security Commission Sadako Ogata rightly noted, shifting attention to human security does not necessarily means replacing state security, but complementing it.⁵

Security sector reform in Ukraine is now under way, and many efforts have been done since its beginning in stormy 2014. The documents adopted during the last three years reflect the attempts to implement modern democratic paradigm of se-

5. Ogata, S. (2003), "Empowering People for Human Security", Payne Lecture, Stanford University, 28 May 2003, available at: http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0001513/documents/4_Empowering_People_Ogata.pdf.

curity while simultaneously focusing on repelling Russia's aggression and strengthening national security and defence potential.

The new National Security Strategy of Ukraine (2015) envisages building of "a new system of relations between citizens, society and state based on the values of freedom and democracy".⁶ With that, attention to identifying and addressing traditional threats to state security dominates in the document over the threats to human security; the main role in providing security is given to armed forces, intelligence and law enforcement agencies while the active participating role of civil society is not envisaged. In this respect, the Concept of Development of Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine (2016) is more progressive – besides the traditional actors in security and defence sector, the Concept envisages "shaping conditions for a broad involvement of non-governmental organizations to carrying out tasks in the interests of national security and defence".⁷ Guaranteeing personal security, constitutional rights and freedoms of human and citizen, democracy and rule of law, along with territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, are coined in the aim of the Concept.

Law On National Security of Ukraine (with latest amendments of 2015) envisages a progressive definition of national security, noting first of all "protection of vital interests of man and citizen, society and the state, which ensured the sustainable development of society..."⁸ Article 7 of the Law actually lists all basic threats to human security along with threats to state security. However, while human/citizen is listed first object of national security (Article 3), but among the subjects of national security (Article 4) citizens and their associations are listed in the very bottom; and their role (defined in the last paragraph of

the Article 9) is actually limited to participation in elections, attracting attention of the public institutions to dangerous processes, and protection of own rights and security by legitimate means. This indicates that amid the recognition of human security importance, there is a lack of clear understanding of what important role civil society can play in security sphere, and how to organise its effective cooperation with the responsible authorities.

The police reform could be considered the most successful example of security sector reforming in Ukraine with view to human security factor. The Concept of Priority Measures to Reform the System of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (2014) declared the rejection of the militarization of the Interior ministry and transition from a punitive to social service content of the police work. It was stressed that the law enforcement authorities "should shift the focus of their work on communication with the public".⁹ Development Strategy of the Internal Affairs Agencies of Ukraine (2014) envisaged civil control over police activity, and declared "partnership interaction with communities within the *community policing* generally accepted approach" as the major priority.¹⁰ Law of Ukraine on the National Police (2015) determines police as "a central executive body that serves society by ensuring the protection of human rights, combating crime, maintaining public security and order". Article 11 of the Law envisages partnership between police and communities and set the level of people's confidence in police as the main criterion for evaluating its effectiveness.¹¹ Though the experts stressed certain shortcomings of the Law on National Police,¹² general effect from the police reform was positive that

6. National Security Strategy of Ukraine (2015), available at: <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/287/2015>.

7. The Concept of Development of Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine (2016), available at: <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/92/2016>.

8. Law On National Security of Ukraine (2003-2015), available at: <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/964-15>.

9. Concept of Priority Measures to Reform the System of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (2014), available at: <https://www.npu.gov.ua/uk/publish/article/1221414>.

10. Development Strategy of the Internal Affairs Agencies of Ukraine (2014), available at: <https://www.npu.gov.ua/uk/publish/article/1221365>.

11. Law of Ukraine on the National Police (2015), available at: <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/580-19>.

12. Telychkin, I. (2016), "Reform of the Interior and the Prosecution", available at: <https://helsinki.org.ua/reformuvannya-orhaniv-vnutrishnih-sprav-ta-prokuratury-i-telychkin>.

was proven by almost twice rise in people's confidence to the new police.¹³

One more important document to be mentioned is the National Human Rights Strategy (2015), which rightly states that under conditions of military aggression the issue of human rights is especially vital, as "the risks of disproportionate restriction of the rights and freedoms increase, which requires special control of the society". It is stressed that along with priority tasks on strengthening national security, overcoming the economic crisis, reforming public administration and etc., "ensuring the human rights and freedoms remains the main duty of the state and should determine the content and direction of the state activity in all its efforts".¹⁴ With that, the experts claim that several legislation amendments designed to facilitate combating terrorism and prosecution of crimes related to Russian aggression in the East of Ukraine, create conditions that can be used to substantially restrict human rights.¹⁵

International cooperation in security sector reform: Human security aspect

Much work has been done in security sector reform thanks to the Ukraine's cooperation with the international partners, first of all NATO, the OSCE and the EU.

NATO-Ukraine cooperation

NATO-Ukraine cooperation is not limited to the military component and includes as substantial part democratic reforms both in the security and

defence sector, and in all other spheres of country's life. From 2003 to 2008, the Programme of cooperation was determined by the Annual Ukraine-NATO Action Plans that included such components as strengthening democratic control over security sector, ensuring rule of law, providing human rights and freedoms, combating corruption, economic reforms and etc.,¹⁶ thus contributing to focusing reforms on human security issues. Since 2009, Action Plans have been replaced by the Annual National Programmes of Ukraine's preparation to NATO Membership,¹⁷ later transformed into Annual National Programmes of Ukraine-NATO cooperation that also emphasised on democratic reforms and human rights.

Substantial practical assistance was provided to Ukraine under the framework of the NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund policy. Launched in 2005, NATO's Professional Development Programme trains key civilian security and defence officials on effective democratic management and building local capacity thus assisting Ukraine in strengthening civil and democratic control over its security and defence structures. Since 2007, Ukraine has been participating in the NATO Building Integrity Programme, aimed at strengthening integrity, transparency, accountability and good governance in the defence and related security sector. In 2016, Ukraine received support through nine NATO Trust Fund projects with estimated total budget of about 40 million EUR.¹⁸

NATO experience and assistance was also important for establishing in Ukraine in 2014 of the Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) as "a systematic, planned activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations and law enforcement agencies established under the law of Ukraine in coordination and cooperation with

13. E.g., see: "The level of confidence to the new police is more than twice higher than to the old militia – poll" (2015), available at: <https://www.unian.ua/society/1151178-riven-doviri-do-novoji-patrolnoji-politsiji-bilsh-nij-udvichi-vischij-nij-do-staroji-militsiji-opituvannya.html>; "2016 political outcome – a national survey" (2016), available at: <http://dif.org.ua/article/2016-y-politichni-pidsumki-zagalnonatsionalne-opituvannya>.

14. National Human Rights Strategy (2015), available at: <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/501/2015>.

15. Banchuk, O. (2017), "The freedom that we are losing", available at: http://gazeta.dt.ua/internal/svoboda-yaku-mi-vtrachayemo-240491_.html.

16. E.g., see: Ukraine-NATO Action Plan for 2003 (2003), available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b030324u.pdf>.

17. Annual National Programme for 2009 on Ukraine's preparation to NATO Membership (2009), available at: <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/600/2009>.

18. "NATO Trust Funds' Assistance to Ukraine" (2016), available at: <http://eesri.org/2016/11/nato-trust-funds-assistance-to-ukraine>.

the executive authorities, local authorities, public associations, organizations and citizens in the areas of military units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine deployment in order to create a positive public opinion and providing favourable conditions for the implementation of the tasks and functions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine by assisting the civilian population in solving of life problems with the use of military and non-military capabilities".¹⁹

OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe traditionally pays much attention to the issues of human rights and human security.

The Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine (PCU) implements projects focusing on spreading human security norms within civilian security sector reform in Ukraine, namely: training new police patrol officers in combating human trafficking and domestic violence; improving community police approach; training the reformed neighbourhood police units; supporting human-rights-based education. The PCU assists Ukrainian Parliament, Ministry of Defence and Security Service to learn and introduce international best practices in the sphere of civilian control over the security sector and respect of security agencies for human rights. These efforts include the development of legal instruments, training courses, awareness-raising seminars and roundtables with the involvement of civil society. Significant expert assistance was provided to facilitate with reforming the Constitution and judiciary as well as integrating civil society in justice reform.

The PCU performs projects aimed at confidence-building measures to facilitate dialogue between the state and civil society organizations,²⁰ as well as to support dialogue between different parts

of Ukrainian society and from different regions of the country.²¹ The PCU published many documents with practical recommendations on improving human security situation, e.g. the manual for specialized course on combating domestic violence for the faculties of public security policing of higher educational institutions of the Ministry of Interior of Ukraine;²² the guide for precinct police inspectors on combating trafficking in human beings;²³ the handbook on gender equality and non-discrimination for students of higher education institution;²⁴ the handbook on conflict sensitive journalism with best practices and recommendations,²⁵ etc.

European Union Advisory Mission

The European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) Ukraine began operations from its headquarters in Kyiv in December 2014, aiming to assist the Ukrainian authorities "towards a sustainable reform of the civilian security sector through strategic advice and hands-on support for specific reform measures based on EU standards and international principles of good governance and human rights".²⁶

The EUAM Ukraine activity is based on three pillars: Strategic advice on civilian security sector reform, in particular the need to develop civilian security strategies; Support for the implementation of reforms, through the delivery of hands-on advice, training and other projects; Cooperation and coordination, to ensure that reform efforts

19. Civil-Military Cooperation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, official website, available at: <https://cimic.com.ua/en>.

20. Kuyumdzieva, A. (2010), *International practices on confidence-building measures between the state and civil society organizations*, Kyiv, 110 p., available at: <http://www.osce.org/ukraine/75883>.

21. OSCE (2014), "*OSCE National Dialogue Project in Ukraine: The Facts*", available at: <http://www.osce.org/ukraine/116881>.

22. Zaporozhtsev, A.V., Labun, A.V and Zabroda, D.H, at al. (2012), *Manual for specialized course on combating domestic violence*, Kyiv, 246 p., available at: <http://www.osce.org/ukraine/93439>.

23. *Combating Trafficking in Human Beings. Guide for Precinct Police Inspectors* (2012), Kyiv, 40 p., available at: <http://www.osce.org/ukraine/93272>.

24. Shturkhetyskiy, S. (ed.) (2014), *Gender Media Practice: Textbook on Gender Equality and Non-Discrimination for Students of Higher Education Institution*, Kyiv, 206 p., available at: <http://www.osce.org/ukraine/284961>.

25. Buromensky, M., Shturkhetyskiy, S., Beals E., at al. (2016), *Conflict Sensitive Journalism: Best Practices and Recommendations*, BAITE, Kyiv, 118 p., available at: <http://www.osce.org/ukraine/254526>.

26. The European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) Ukraine, official website, available at: <http://www.euam-ukraine.eu/en/what-we-do/our-mission>.

are coordinated with Ukrainian and international actors.

The EUAM Ukraine has provided strategic advice on reforming concept papers and strategies, including the Strategy of the Reform of the Internal Affairs Agencies; National Police Reform Concept; Law of Ukraine on the National Police; draft Law on Freedom of Assembly, and National Human Rights Strategy.

The EUAM Ukraine contributed to establishment of the National Police of Ukraine by carrying out numerous training programmes and workshops, including on public order, rights of peaceful assembly, community policing, leadership, and strategic communication. Due to the EUAM support, the Concept of community policing has been established for the first time in Ukraine and is being implemented through provision of strategic advice and training. Together with Ukrainian National Police, the EUAM established four joint working groups to develop concepts and action plans on community policing, criminal investigations, public order and human-resource management. The EUAM Ukraine supported the establishment of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office and National Anti-Corruption Prevention Agency.

Integrating human security aspects into security sector reform and development (SSR/D) policy: Slovakian, Finnish and German best practices

Of vital importance is the experience of Ukraine's neighbouring countries that successfully overcame the post-communism legacy, as well as leading NATO and EU member states, including those directly bordering Russia and having lasting experience of countering its aggressive policy. Nowadays the above experience is being implemented in Ukraine through the broad international advisory and expert support.

Despite certain differences in approaches to reforming and implementing SSR/D, many common elements make the *Slovak* experience of reforms

extremely important for Ukraine. This experience can and should be useful for Kyiv in its complex and long path of democratic transformation aimed at deepening association with the EU and expanding partner cooperation with NATO. More than 25 years of the Slovak experience in the field of SSR/D could be considered as successful one, the main evidence of which is the membership of this former post-communist country in NATO and the EU. There are certainly some problems here, but they are not so critical given the global nature of the current crisis of European security.

The main emphasis in the Slovak SSR/D was given on ensuring sufficient security conditions for ordinary citizens that Bratislava managed to realize in practice. In that regard, the level of protection of citizens' lives and their safety, as well as the general level of well-being and the provision of basic civil rights and freedoms were selected as main indicators of SSR effectiveness.²⁷

Another important element of SSR/D was the level of interaction between the state and society generally estimated to be quite high. At the same time, the selective attitude towards key actors in the security sphere was eliminated so that to engage with all citizens of the country who are such actors in fact.

In Slovakia, as a result of security sector reform, an effective public communication system was established and is operational nowadays timely contributing to responses to a variety of security problems that require urgent solutions. Thus, the public opinion plays the role of an indicator of certain failures in functioning of the security system as such. Bratislava's experience is important from the point of view of developing and using communication campaigns and information strategies to raise public awareness of the goals and objectives of SSR/D process.

On the backdrop of a more tense security situation in Europe and the Baltic Sea region, *Finland's*

27. Gyárfášová, O. & Górká-Winter B. (2015), *Security Sector Reform: Handbook*, Marketing and Business Group, s.r.o., Bratislava, 156 p., available at: http://cena.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/final_final.pdf.

experience and best practices in promoting human security in SSR/D is also very interesting for Ukraine having in mind bilateral relationship of this relatively small country with neighbouring Russia and its deep practical cooperation as a partner with NATO.

According to the modern Finnish Foreign and Security Policy, enhancing cooperation between the different elements of security sector and actors of civil society is defined as an integral element in strengthening national crisis resilience.²⁸ Based on the principle of comprehensive security and in close co-operation among the authorities, organizations, representatives of the business community and civil society, the Finnish Security Strategy for Society was elaborated to meet the changing security environment.²⁹ This Strategy has been considered as a core document in the field of national security supported by a vast number of planning documents counting all imaginable threats and challenges to the security environment, which could have an impact on the country's independence, territorial integrity, and on society's basic values, and which would call on actions to maintain security and the welfare of citizens as well as sustain a functioning society. The goal of the Strategy is to ensure the functioning of society, safeguard Finland's national sovereignty and promote the security and well-being of citizens.

To reach this goal the following main functions vital to society were defined to form the basis for preparedness, namely: a well-functioning judicial system; sufficient border surveillance; smooth traffic and a clean living environment. According to the document, when the basic functions of society are in order, it is possible to return to normal life after crises without losing the firm ground on which society rests. The functions vital to society must be secured in all times: in normal conditions as well as in crises. All actors in society – authori-

ties, companies, organizations and communities involved in security studies – play an important role in securing these functions.

Despite the fact that one can't find real revolutionary turning points on the security or defence fields of Finnish society, including in the provided Strategy, that has to be updated since its last revision in 2010, Finnish SSR/D policy has been advanced step by step. Almost all changes in threat perceptions have been followed by actions strengthening the old structures of security in the society so that strengthening national crisis resilience.

Against the backdrop of a dynamic security environment and hybrid threats to the state and open modern society, strengthening resilience also became increasingly important for SSR/D process in *Germany*. Hence, the German Government renders its approach to national security more comprehensive by continuously identifying and adapting areas requiring protection; further developing civil defence planning with the goal of harmonizing crisis management procedures; institutionalizing a whole-of-society discussion on future security requirements; intensifying the security partnership between the state, industry, and the scientific community through regular exchanges of information and expertise and putting this partnership into practice particularly in the cyber and information domain.³⁰

Strengthening the resilience and robustness is of particular importance for Germany's whole-of-government approach to security. Such an approach comprises hazard prevention and defence, organizes them for tackling internal and external threats, and uses resources with foresight and sound judgment. This includes protecting the sovereignty and integrity of German territory and German citizens and rescuing German nationals in emergencies abroad. This means intensifying

28. Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy (2016), Prime Minister's Office Publications, available at: <http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=159273&GUID={BE1F0734-B715-4C7F-94AA-CBFD3AF7EA5A}>.

29. The Security Strategy for Society 2010, available at: <http://www.yhteiskunnanturvallisuus.fi/en.html>.

30. White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (2016), available at: <https://www.bmvg.de/resource/resource/UIRvcjZYSW1RcEVHaUd4cklzQU4yNWFVejhLbjVyYnR10ct-3ZIU1N09FVUI5TVFNvks2WW1ZemswZlInVWZ5VU5mNHArD2F-nOFRJdHJVZFhINFZFMXV5emNLenV4R0tPLzJlcTBTVi8wYkE9/2016%20White%20Paper.pdf>.

cooperation between government bodies, citizens and private operators of critical infrastructure, as well as the media and network operators. Everyone involved in this approach must work closely together.

In Germany, national security is defined as not only a task of the state, but also increasingly a joint task of the state, industry, the scientific community, and society. A common understanding of potential risks is the basis on which to build whole-of-society resilience. Such resilience should be based on society's ability to protect and help itself in the event of a crisis, complements public and commercial measures to prevent and manage crises. German Government believes that only modern comprehensive security policy can reduce risks. This must be accompanied by a discussion on the limits of security and acceptable levels of risk for the state, the economy and society.

Amid continuing German SSR/D process, the guiding principle of communication strategy between all parties involved must be transparency, which at the same time must take into account the sensitive nature of certain information. The state, the economy and society are all equally susceptible to risks. The physical infrastructure of the state and the economy is a target as is public opinion, which is often subject to external influence. Therefore, according to German officials, building long-term resilience in open and democratic security and defence system is a whole-of-society task.

The German Armed Forces – Bundeswehr - presents itself as an armed force in a democracy and for democracy. Strengthening the Bundeswehr's place in society will help in promoting human security aspects so that ordinary people could recognize the importance of citizens in uniform, rely on them, be grateful, and feel connected to them. The above human security aspects were defined as follows:

- Approaching to the general public – through the personal conduct, openness, and willingness to engage in discussion;

- Promoting discourse on and shaping the discussion of security policy in society;
- Conducting extensive and serious as possible and as controversial as necessary constant exchange about armed forces role and its tasks;
- Intensifying exchanges with important actors and developing concept of civic education;
- Expanding reserve service and keeping it attractive to provide an essential link between the armed forces and society, etc.

Implementing best practices in Ukraine

Provided examples are not comprehensive on their nature but at the same time could demonstrate the relevance of the topic in the general context of SSR/D policy specific to different security models applicable to Ukraine as well as to other East European countries.

An important element of all the best practices is a correct accentuation to achieve practical results of SSR/D aimed at ensuring the safety and well-being of every citizen and society as a whole. This task remains to be a key priority and prevails in the solution of issues related to the state security as such.

Strengthening the existing structures of security in the society will gradually strengthen national crisis resilience. To fulfil this task, the Ukrainian civil society, represented by public institutions and non-governmental organizations, should become an indispensable part of the security sector. Only practical and broad integration of civil society into the security sector structure and non-selective involvement in solving problems in the SSR/D process could give the desired result.

Establishing effective public communication system timely contributing to responses to a variety of human security problems, including those related to

manipulation with public opinion, should be an important precondition for successful SSR/D process.

Another important lesson learned is the constant need for continuous assessment and revision of key strategic documents, the consistent development of the national security and defence strategies. The defence component of the security sector should not be isolated from the national security system, remaining one of its important subsystem within the framework of a broad, whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to the SSR/D process. At the same time, the role of armed forces should be strengthened in promoting human security aspects in a democracy and for democracy.

The availability of a robust international expert potential being involved in Ukraine, including at the Governmental level, gives the reason to hope for positive results and successful transfer of the given experiences and best practices. However, for a stable and sustainable success in integrating human security aspects into the SSR/D, Kyiv needs to ensure the continuity of this process, taking into account changing security environment.

Conclusions

Ukraine faces a challenging task of performing security sector reform at the time of external aggression. Complicated dilemmas of withstanding sophisticated hybrid warfare that includes hidden threats masked as fake quasi-civil initiatives and speculations on fundamental freedoms as a camouflage for the aggressive intentions, cause temptation to postpone the human security is-

ues to "better times" and to focus on traditional state security.

Though the traditional threats are still vital, as Russian invasion in Ukraine clearly indicates, the human security paradigm which puts people at the centre should be a hallmark for the security sector reforms in the countries that chose a modern democratic model of development. It is a complicated, but simultaneously a very important task for Ukraine to avoid the limitation of the fundamental freedoms while effectively protecting nation from the external aggression, to find balance between countering aggressive propaganda and protecting freedom of speech and media, between preventing provocations and safeguarding fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion, right to peaceful meetings and etc.

Ukraine has achieved certain progress and positive changes in legislation, but still lacks the comprehensive model of effective cooperation between the civil society and authorities in security sector reform with focusing on human security as a conceptual framework. The level and effectiveness of comprehensive civil society engagement in security sector reform should be considered as an indicator of the transformation process from an elite-captured government model to a citizen-oriented one. In a citizen-oriented state, security sector serves the population, and society both is able to hold government to account and to collaborate with government for providing common good. Democratic countries go on pushing security sector transit toward a human security model, and this is the way Ukraine should proceed.