



# Human Security and Security Sector Reform in Eastern Europe

**Maksym Khylo, Oleksandr Tytarchuk (eds.)**

June, 2017

**STUDY**

- Human security and security sector reform: experience of Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, Lithuania, and Slovakia. Best practices, common problems, and important lessons learned.
- Though the traditional threats are still vital, the human security paradigm placing people at the centre should be a hallmark for the security sector reforms in countries that have chosen a modern democratic model of development.
- In democratic societies, human security and state security are interconnected components that complement each other. Only those societies can be resilient, where people are properly protected from the entire range of threats, and where human security is guaranteed in its modern and inclusive sense.

**Contents**

Human Security: World's Practices and Ukraine's Perspective . . . . . 5  
*Maksym Khylo, Oleksandr Tytarchuk, East European Security Research Initiative Foundation, Ukraine*

Human Security vs. National Security . . . . . 14  
*Natalya Belitser, Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy, Ukraine*

Human Security – Important Element for Democracy Building in Armenia . . . . . 24  
*Hasmik Grigoryan, Stepan Grigoryan, Analytical Centre on Globalization and Regional Cooperation, Armenia*

Human Security and Security Sector Reform in Georgia: A Critical Reflection . . . . 31  
*Bidzina Lebanidze, Georgian Institute of Politics*

Political Security as one of the Main Conditions for Human Security  
in Moldova. . . . . 36  
*Ion Manole, Promo-LEX Association, Moldova*

Rights and Security of a Person in Belarus. . . . . 42  
*Andrei Porotnikov, Belarus Security Blog*

Assessing the Essential Elements for Democratic Control of Armed Forces in  
Lithuania . . . . . 48  
*Grazvydas Jasutis, General Jonas Zemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania*

Human Dimension and Security Sector Reform in Slovakia: Mission  
(In)complete? . . . . . 56  
*Samuel Goda, Slovak Foreign Policy Association*

### Human Security vs. National Security

*Natalya Belitser, Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy, Ukraine*

*"...Human focuses on the safety of individuals and communities. At minimum, human security refers to safety from direct threats of violence. A comprehensive approach to human security includes three components: freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity".<sup>1</sup>*

This definition is provided by the extended research conducted within the framework of the international collaborative project involving nearly 100 organisations around the world and facilitated by a consortium consisting of: the Alliance for Peacebuilding, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, and the University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute for International Peace. Such an approach to the very notion of "security" is rather new and yet poorly comprehensible for both governments and populations of the post-Soviet states including Ukraine. The main reason for such state of affairs is because people living for too long time in isolation behind the iron wall have been brainwashed by the overwhelming and insistent propaganda on a "sieged fortress" encircled by vicious capitalist enemies, wishing to destroy their own country of "true socialism" and their allies. As a result, indoctrination by the idea of national (actually, state) security to be above all had become so widespread that the whole apparatus of law enforcement bodies being focused on performing exactly this function was perceived as something quite normal. Inevitably, the issue of the respect to and safeguarding human security, including personal security and observance of human rights, was pushed far away from any priority.

After having received such kind of heritage, to change the overall situation in favour of human

dimension of security turned out a challenge and extremely difficult task that requires not only radical reformation of the police, army, intelligence services etc. but the system of values and to some extent, the whole social mentality. To achieve this goal in times of the acute crisis lasting for over three years – actually, in times of the undeclared officially "hybrid war" with the Russian Federation, named instead "Anti-Terror Operation" (ATO), makes the task even more complicated.

State security under threat

Indeed, from the very beginning of the dramatic events of 2014 – the occupation immediately followed by the Russian annexation of Crimea, the survival of Ukraine as an independent sovereign state was put under question. Caught fully unprepared for such kind of aggression, with practically non-existing army and security bodies, disordered and dysfunctional governmental institutions and parliament, Ukraine struggled for its very existence, and under such circumstances, state security at that time seemed indeed above all.

Apart from many other aspects, general frustration was caused by the failure of international community to react properly to the unprecedented case in the post-WWII Europe – direct annexation of a part of the neighbouring state's territory. Especially shocking this act of aggression looks in light of the Budapest Memorandum signed on December 5, 1994, by Ukraine, also the US, UK and Russia as the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) depositary states as a condition of Ukraine's joining the NPT as a nuclear weapons-free state. This decision entailed relinquishing its nuclear arsenal – the world's third largest, to Russia. By this document the signatory states declared commitments to Ukraine's security through the Memorandum on Security Assurances, providing pledges to Ukraine in the case of the use of force against its territorial integrity—precisely the kind of situation that occurred in Crimea in 2014. Of course, the Budapest Memorandum is a diplomatic, political document and not a legally binding treaty; nor does the memorandum foresee any

1. Schirch, Lisa (editor). Handbook on Human Security: A Civil-Military-Police Curriculum. The Hague: Alliance for Peacebuilding, GPPAC, Kroc Institute, November 2015, <https://www.peaceportal.org/documents/130617663/0/FINAL+HANDBOOK+November+30+1154.pdf>.

punitive provisions in case of its breach. However, it does link the fulfilment of these security commitments to Ukraine's nuclear renunciation, and brutal violation of them by one of the signatory states may have deteriorating consequences not only for Ukraine but also for the very future of the NPT – the treaty aimed to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction around the world – by obviously discouraging other states from joining it and thus undermining the regime of non-proliferation.<sup>2</sup> Concerning Ukraine, it could – and should – look for some other potential means of re-considering the Budapest Memorandum in order to incline the US and the UK to use stronger leverage in response to Russia's aggression and in such a way, strengthen its state security that is still under threat.

#### Human security and human rights on the occupied territories

Current situation in the occupied Crimea and in the east of Ukraine, although differing in the nature of threats, presents gravest danger not only for those taking part directly in military actions, but for the civilians, too. The Donbas war has already taken nearly 10.000 of human lives; number of hostages and "disappearances" also amounts to thousands. Situation with human rights observance on the occupied territories is horrible and constantly deteriorating. Ukrainian, including Crimean, HR groups try hard to monitor brutal violations, collecting and documenting confirmed cases of summary executions, 'disappearances' (abductions), arbitrary detentions, numerous searches etc. It turned out that one of the major threats to many of detainees is a widespread practice of tortures by 'investigators' aiming to force the victims to 'recognise' the crimes committed.

In the report "Surviving Hell",<sup>3</sup> human rights activists spoke with those who had been held cap-

tive by the militants. They found that over 87% of Ukrainian soldiers and 50% of civilians taken prisoner by the militants in Donbas had been subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading ill-treatment. In over 40% of the cases, key roles had been played by Russian Federation mercenaries, FSB or people who identified themselves as Russian military personnel.

Recently, adviser to the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) chief Yuriy Tandit claims that 3,136 Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilian hostages have been released or tracked since Russia has unleashed aggression in Donbas.<sup>4</sup> Numerous war crimes and crimes against humanity are recorded on the occupied territory.<sup>5</sup>

Such tragic examples as continuous shelling of the village Avdiivka by the militants led and fully supported by Russian troops and the so-called "volunteers" remind to some extent the Syrian Aleppo: it repeatedly caused not only collapse of any kind of vital infrastructure responsible for electricity and water supplies, ruined buildings and other damages, but resulted in a number of local residents wounded or dead. On the occupied territories, all human rights and freedoms are brutally violated, raising a question of what can be done by Ukraine and international community to stop this lawlessness and prevent further crimes.

In contrast to lawlessness on the occupied territories of Donbas where lootings, beatings and other crimes are realities of everyday life, one can expect that in the annexed Crimea, at least legislation of the RF could have been observed. But this is not the case. Human rights situation in Crimea is worse than in other regions of Russia, and abundant violation of both international and domestic legal norms and standards has its own specificity. There are systematic attempts to suppress the voices and/or activities of any person or

2. For more details, see: "The Nuclear Fallout of Trump's Possible Dé-tente with Putin" by Mariana Budjeryn and Andreas Umland, February 16, 2017, <http://hir.harvard.edu/nuclear-fallout-trump-possible-detente-putin/>.

3. Surviving Hell: Testimonies of Victims on Places of Illegal Detention in Donbas, <http://www.osce.org/odhr/185431?download=true>.

4. UNIAN, 21 March 2017, <https://www.unian.info/war/1834126-sbu-over-3000-ukrainian-hostages-freed-or-tracked-amid-russian-aggression-in-donbas.html>.

5. Donbas in Flames: Guide to the conflict zone, [https://prometheus.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Donbas\\_v\\_Ogni\\_ENG\\_web\\_1-4.pdf](https://prometheus.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Donbas_v_Ogni_ENG_web_1-4.pdf).

## HUMAN SECURITY VS. NATIONAL SECURITY

group manifesting – or just being suspected of – disagreement with the fact of occupation, but first and foremost – of the indigenous Crimean Tatar people. Systemic discrimination, persecutions and repressions targeting Crimean Tatars aim at their intimidation and forcing them to leave the peninsula which is their only homeland.

As a result of occupation and according to the most cautious estimations, there are at least 24 political prisoners, 16 ‘disappeared’ and 10 persons killed. Among them, number of Crimean Tatars is: 18 out of 24, 10 out of 16, and 7 out of 10. (Proportion of Crimean Tatars within the whole population of Crimea is about 14 – 15%). The banning, in the fall of 2016, of the Mejlis - the main representative organ of the Crimean Tatar indigenous people – as an ‘extremist organization’ is an unprecedented case of banning not just an ‘organisation’ or ‘association’ but the body elected by the whole indigenous people.

Especially endangered are Crimean Muslims, subjected permanently to numerous searches, detentions and arrests under charges of belonging to Hizb ut-Tahrir (from 2003 claimed by the RF legislation to be an ‘extremist organization’). But in general, ‘groups of risk’ the members of which are under continuous threat and whose rights, freedoms and security are brutally violated, include all people with pro-Ukrainian stance, not accepting the Russian occupation and being punished for the slightest expression of their ‘dissent’ – like manifestations of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar flags, national symbols and communicating in mother tongue.<sup>6</sup>

Up to date, all efforts to ensure unimpeded access to the occupied territory of Crimea and Donbas of national and international monitoring missions remain fruitless. Claims and calls for this articulated by the most influential international bodies such as the UNO, OSCE, Council of Europe, European Parliament etc. did not bring any positive results,

---

6. For more details, see: “Crimean Tatars as an Indigenous People” (in Ukrainian) by Natalya Belitser, Kyiv, 2017, pp. 1 – 120, and bibliography and references within.

in particular, due to the veto right imposed by the RF that is simultaneously an aggressor state and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Activities of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) are restricted by counter-actions of the armed occupants preventing them from proper functioning, denying access to storages of heavy weapons, shooting down their drones, and threatening the lives of the OSCE personnel. Proposals to substitute the SMM by international police mission or UN peacekeepers so far failed; in 2016, the information that all leaders of the ‘Normandy four’ countries agreed for the deployment of the OSCE police mission armed with personal weapons was renounced by the Russian side. As the Kremlin’s press service said, “the Russian Federation supports the activities of the OSCE monitoring mission in Donbas, not the police mission”.<sup>7</sup>

Facing such a deadlock and helplessness to restore the post-WWII world order, Ukraine might try to strengthen human security regime on the occupied territories – relying, first and foremost, on the internationally recognised fact of the occupation of Crimean peninsula – by using more effectively the existing instruments of international humanitarian law. In this respect, let us recall certain provisions of the 4<sup>th</sup> Geneva Convention of 1949 – the treaty ratified by both Ukraine and Russia.<sup>8</sup>

According to this convention, the provisions of Part II cover the whole of the populations of the countries in conflict, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, nationality, religion or political opinion, and are intended to alleviate the sufferings caused by war (Art. 13). In the context of the application of further particular articles, special attention should be paid to the institution of the so-called ‘Protecting Powers’. As is stipulated by Art.9, “The present Convention shall be applied with the cooperation and under

---

7. UNIAN, 04 June 2016: <http://www.unian.info/politics/1365857-handguns-for-self-defense-kremlin-agrees-on-armed-osce-monitors-in-donbas.html>.

8. Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949: <https://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/6756482d86146898c125641e004aa3c5?OpenDocument>.

the scrutiny of the Protecting Powers whose duty it is to safeguard the interests of the Parties to the conflict. For this purpose, the Protecting Powers may appoint, apart from their diplomatic or consular staff, delegates from amongst their own nationals or the nationals of other neutral Powers. The said delegates shall be subject to the approval of the Power with which they are to carry out their duties”.

Defining the Status and Treatment of Protected Persons (Part III, Section I. Provisions common to the territories of the parties to the conflict and to occupied territories), convention states that “Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity” (Art. 27.). Moreover, Protected Persons shall have every facility for making application to the Protecting Powers, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the National Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) Society of the country where they may be, as well as to any organization that might assist these several organizations shall be granted all facilities for that purpose by the authorities, within the bounds set by military or security considerations them (Art. 30.). Apart from the visits of the delegates of the Protecting Powers and of the International Committee of the Red Cross, provided for by Article 143, the Detaining or Occupying Powers shall facilitate, as much as possible, visits to protected persons by the representatives of other organizations whose object is to give spiritual aid or material relief to such persons. No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from third parties (Art. 31).

Taking into account this year conscription campaign, for the young Crimean residents especially relevant is Art. 51 clearly stressing that the Occupying Power may not compel protected persons to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces. No pres-

sure or propaganda which aims at securing voluntary enlistment is permitted.

In view of the repeatedly surfaced insinuations that Ukraine is responsible for violating human rights in Crimea by introducing restrictions on trade, water and electricity supplies, Article 55 must be kept in mind and used as a strong argument: “To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power *has the duty* of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate”.

Concerning the notorious “Case of 26 February” accusing Crimean Tatar leaders and activists in what happened during the mass protest action in Simferopol when Crimea was still formally under jurisdiction of Ukraine, Art. 70 should be applied, because “Protected persons shall not be arrested, prosecuted or convicted by the Occupying Power *for acts committed or for opinions expressed before the occupation*, or during a temporary interruption thereof, with the exception of breaches of the laws and customs of war”. Very important is also Art. 74, according to which “Representatives of the Protecting Power shall have the right to attend the trial of any protected person, unless the hearing has, as an exceptional measure, to be held in camera in the interests of the security of the Occupying Power, which shall then notify the Protecting Power. A notification in respect of the date and place of trial shall be sent to the Protecting Power”. Not less significant is provision of Art. 76 that “Protected persons accused of offences shall be detained in the occupied country, and if convicted they shall serve their sentences therein...” (Whereas, for example, those arrested for a criminal offence on suspicions of belonging to or supporting the activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir were tried and sentenced to from five to seven years of imprisonment in the Rostov city on the territory of the RF).

So, potential opportunities of strengthening human security and human rights regime in the occupied Crimea by application of the 4<sup>th</sup> Geneva



## HUMAN SECURITY VS. NATIONAL SECURITY

Convention and its Additional Protocol look rather appealing; nevertheless and despite references to this legally binding instrument of international law in the recent PACE resolution, it is not yet used in full measure. The main obstacle to this is, first of all, the implied Russia's objection to observe its obligations as those of the Occupying Power. Indeed, by the end of 2015, the RF already refused to present yearly reports on the fulfilment of such obligations under the pretext that "such reports might become too heavily politicised". Blocking of this proposal occurred at a sitting of the International Red Cross Committee in Geneva and was supported by several other countries; as President of the ICRC responded with regret, in such a way, "the states missed the opportunity to help to protect millions of people".<sup>9</sup>

At the same time, as is known, Geneva Conventions created the main basis of the international humanitarian law and as such, in contrast to other treaties, could not be revised according to the established procedure.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, to find legitimate ways of repudiation these particular instruments would be much more difficult than, for instance, refusing to abide the decisions of the International Criminal Court or the European Court on Human Rights. Therefore, Ukraine must do its best to promote observance of those obligations, in particular, by initiating the formation of the system of Protecting Powers foreseen by the 4<sup>th</sup> Geneva Convention.

This particular opportunity should not be unheeded in view of the unfulfilled pledges of the states – signatories of the Budapest Memorandum. Feeling at least moral and political responsibility with regard to Russia's military aggression against Ukraine, both the US and the UK might perceive favourably such a request. The two other countries – namely, France and China, members of the NPT as the states possessing nuclear arsenals, supported (orally) the Assurances although did

not put their signatures. These states could also be invited to join a club; the RF, on its side, should be proposed to nominate its own candidates for the role of the Protecting Powers.

It should be noted that the idea of attracting Protecting Powers in order to alleviate human rights and human security situation on the occupied territories is already dealt with by a number of Ukrainian CSOs, in particular, human rights and expert communities. Regrettably, their addresses and proposals along this line to governmental officials – including those from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – until now met a deaf ear. Also, while the case of Crimea as an occupied territory has been officially recognised not only by Ukraine but, in 2016, by a number of international resolutions, the situation with the uncontrolled parts of Donetsk and Luhanska oblasts is much more complicated. Despite the fact that those regions have already been recognised as occupied by the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada,<sup>11</sup> opposition to defining them as such in national legislation by a special bill is rather strong, coming, in particular, from the 'profile' Ministry on Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons.<sup>12</sup> This creates additional difficulties in imposing responsibility on the RF in terms of human rights observance and satisfying the population of the uncontrolled "Separate Regions of the DLO" need in food, goods, electricity et al. – the 'hot' issue especially after introducing by the government of the 'blockade' of uncontrolled territories.

In terms of human security, the most acute problem is that of running there the local elections before all troops and ammunitions would be withdrawn and Ukraine regaining its control over the Ukrainian-Russian border. Unfortunately, not only Russia but some Western partners of Ukraine, interpreting certain (rather confusing) points of the 'Minsk agreements' and the

---

9. RF refused report on observance of the Geneva Convention (in Russian), 11 December 2015, [http://www.bbc.com/russian/news/2015/12/151210\\_russia\\_geneva\\_conventions\\_review](http://www.bbc.com/russian/news/2015/12/151210_russia_geneva_conventions_review).

10. Ibid.

---

11. Decree № 254-VIII, 17 March 2015, <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254-VIII>.

12. See, for example: Kiev: In the Donbass Russian control, not occupation, January 26, 2017, <http://ukropnews24.com/kyiv-in-the-donbass-russian-control-not-occupation/>.

order of their fulfilment, often insist on this particular point to be realised without strong guarantees of the proper and effective security for all actors and stakeholders to be involved in the electoral process.<sup>13</sup>

We believe that the whole matter of human security on the occupied territories is worth of broader discussion at national and international levels with the engagement of all interested parties.

#### Human security in the 'Mainland' Ukraine

##### *First steps*

After initial shock of 2014, Ukraine rather quickly restored its state apparatus, military forces, law enforcement and security agencies, and became able to start taking the first necessary steps on the path of safeguarding human security. The first visible signs of departing from the habitual functions of law enforcement bodies are related to the appearance of the 'new police' beginning from the reformed patrol police.

Briefly, the whole story has begun on July 2, 2015, when Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine adopted innovative law 'On National Police'.<sup>14</sup> Civil society actors – mostly, human rights activists – participated in developing the draft and some of their proposals were accepted by lawmakers. Two days later, 2000 new policemen started patrolling the streets of capital city Kyiv. Those young men and women (21 -35 years old) have been intensely trained for three months; training courses pursued not only improving professional capacities but also introducing ethical norms and principles inherent in civilised democratic world. In those courses – in particular, concerning human rights and non-discrimination – trainers and independent experts from CSOs were actively engaged. Such kind of training was by itself 'experimental',

because never before such a 'multistakeholder' approach had been used.

Reaction of the society was quite remarkable. It should be recalled that before 'Revolution of Dignity' (2013 – 2014) people's mistrust in post-soviet 'militiamen' was almost absolute. In critical situations, any help from them was not expected; public opinion polls showed the level of support by only 2% of citizens, whereas 66% were for a total reformation of the whole law-enforcement system. Brutal attitude of militia special units (in particular, notorious 'Berkut') responsible for beatings, killings and tortures of protesters added to the existing tensions. Therefore, much societal hopes and expectations have been invested in the creation of a modern, Western-type police. Despite rather severe rules and procedures for the selection of candidates, a number of applicants were very high: from 5 to 30 candidates (in different cities) for one vacancy. It is interesting to note that about two thirds of the applicants have higher education, and that between 20% and 40% of them were females. Former militiamen amounted to only 10% of the applicants.

The new police performance was met by quite positive attitude of the population, but at the same time, subjected to the insistent and assertive observation and constant monitoring – both formal and informal. Each move and/or incident with the involvement of policemen has been vividly discussed by Internet users and covered by numerous bloggers. In particular, people positively react to the objective actions of the new patrolling police targeting those violators belonging to 'VIPs' who used to be 'above the law'.

Transparency of the recruiting 'new people for the new police' and further proceedings have been found 'unprecedented' because of establishing numerous channels of communication.<sup>15</sup> Hotline was actively propagated asking, inter alia, to report on any violations perpetrated by the patrol-

13. See, for example: 4 March 2016, <http://www.euointegration.com.ua/news/2016/03/4/7045779/>.

14. Law of Ukraine On National Police, <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/580-19>.

15. For example, apart from the official web-site (<https://www.facebook.com/police.gov.ua?fref=ts>), an open group "New Police: Feedback" appeared on Facebook as soon as on July 8, 2015 (see: <https://www.facebook.com/groups/362866477171436/>).



## HUMAN SECURITY VS. NATIONAL SECURITY

ling police. Also, sharply increased number of calls on '102' emergency number may reflect the increased population trust.

It is important to note that the proclaimed ideology of these police forces is quite different from the former one. Basic concepts are formulated as: '*collaboration, communication, and providing services*'. The main goals are designated as '*to serve and protect*' ("*We are not to punish, we are to ensure your security*"). Indeed, there are many positive responses describing such cases. As a result, after one month of police operations, the level of confidence in them raised significantly: according to the sociological poll by 'RATING' agency, 82% of the residents of Kyiv endorsed appearance of the new police, and 69% of the respondents expect improvement of criminal situation in the city and of their own security; approximately half of them hope also for the successful contribution to counteract corruption. Vision of their activities as a 'first step for better future' was widely shared by police personnel themselves and society at large.

Of course, this 'honeymoon' between ordinary people and new police did not last long; quite a few new servicemen turned unable to meet high expectations and were fired or abandoned the service on their own will. Nevertheless, nowadays the approval rate is slightly above 50% that is still in sharp contrast to previous overwhelming mistrust.

In view of the intense (and not slackening) attention to the activities of the new police, it is surprising that not less important element of ensuring human security – operations of the Ukrainian CIMIC (civil-military cooperation) Group – practically escaped wide public discussion and media coverage. This special unit, established by the General staff yet in 2014 according to NATO standards, accomplishes a lot of important functions, in particular, at the territories of Eastern Ukraine liberated from local separatists and supporting Russian militaries, and coming under the jurisdiction of central authorities. Traditional CIMIC mission usually consists in developing cooperation with local bodies and administrations, regional

and international NGOs and other CSOs and population in general, in particular, providing humanitarian aid, participating in the exchange of prisoners of war and those who perished.

In addition to these conventional tasks, officers of the Ukrainian CIMIC group are also actively engaged in less widespread activities – like repair of the destroyed objects of infrastructure vital for restoring life-support system. The need for this was conditioned by the practically non-functioning bodies of local administrations and self-government in some of the towns and settlements located in the zone of ATO (Anti-Terror Operation). These activities, especially in Donetsk oblast, promoted remarkably improved relations between Ukrainian militaries and local population: according to Colonel Nozdrachev, the Head of the CIMIC Group, support increased from 20-30% a year ago to 80 – 85% in summer 2015.<sup>16</sup> Scarce knowledge about and low level of interest to the CIMIC Group-Ukraine can be explained, perhaps, by the lack of publicity and PR-actions, also by rather rare interviews and other events attracting media.

It could also be added that although human rights and human security are usually regarded as linked inseparably, in the situation of crisis they sometimes come to clashes. For example, since officially war in Ukraine is not recognised (it's still named not a 'war' but 'ATO'), and state of emergency not declared, some human rights activists fight any restrictions relating, in particular, to public events, including rallies and other public gatherings, imposed sometimes by state officials under circumstances of increased danger of provocations and/or terrorist acts threatening human lives. Therefore, although the first steps towards building trustworthy and comprehensive system of modern military and police forces, aimed at not only national but also human security, can be regarded as a moderate success, much more work in this direction is needed. Ever increasing activity of civil society and its rising role in reformation of

---

16. For full text of the interview (in Russian), see: [http://censor.net.ua/resonance/347362/nachalnik\\_simic\\_alekseji\\_nozdrachev\\_god\\_nazad\\_podderjka\\_vsu\\_v\\_nekotoryh\\_gorodah\\_donetskoyi\\_oblasti\\_kolebalas](http://censor.net.ua/resonance/347362/nachalnik_simic_alekseji_nozdrachev_god_nazad_podderjka_vsu_v_nekotoryh_gorodah_donetskoyi_oblasti_kolebalas).

security sector might be a cornerstone of further achievements.

*'Mainland Ukraine': groups of risk*

Situation in Ukraine controlled by legitimate central, regional and local authorities, poses quite different concerns relating to human rights and human security. Several "risk groups" could be identified as being in especially vulnerable position.

Apart from traditionally vulnerable members of Roma ethnic minority who often suffer from discrimination and sometimes acts of violence perpetrated by local gangs and ordinary residents, new challenges have appeared relating to the increased number of refugees, asylum seekers, but also public figures becoming the targets of assassinations and/or terrorist acts.

The fate of asylum seekers from Russia and other authoritarian post-Soviet states is difficult and often dramatic; to get a special status of 'a person in need of a special protection'<sup>17</sup> means coming through exhausting procedure of fighting with the Migration Service habitually denying their claims, and then trying to overcome the negative decisions through court appellations. Since the overwhelming majority of refugees and asylum seekers from the RF and some Central Asia countries are opponents of the existing there regimes persecuted for their political and public activities, their extradition would mean a serious threat to their freedom and even life.<sup>18</sup>

Under Ukrainian law, judges cannot force migration authorities to deliver asylum or other appropriate status, only to reconsider applications; therefore, the 'happy end' in Ukraine for political refugees seems possible only after attracting serious attention of the HR community and media covering their cases. "It is unacceptable to not provide asylum for

people facing persecution for peaceful opposition activities in their own country," asserted the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group (KHRPG) – one of the most efficient NGOs applying great efforts to help the potential victims.<sup>19</sup> In this respect, quite remarkable is a story of three young persons from Krasnodar who were detained for 15 days in summer of 2014, placed on a terrorist watch list and charged with extremism after the attempt to organise a rally demanding broader autonomy for the southern Russia's region Kuban.<sup>20</sup> (Actually, their slogans on the 'federalisation' were mocking Russia's claim to 'federalise' Ukraine).

One of them, Vyacheslav Martynov, fled immediately to Kharkiv where received a strong support from the KHRPG and after several court sittings, did obtain the desirable status in November 2015. The second one, Pyotr Lubchenkov, also having escaped to Ukraine in 2014, remained under the threat of being sent back to Russia until the beginning of 2017, when the eventual decision of rejecting Russia's claim for his extradition was adopted by the General Prosecutor Office of Ukraine. Their colleague Daria Polyudova, who chose to stay in Russia, was sentenced to two years in prison in December 2015 on charges of 'calling for Russia's territorial integrity infringement' -- a sentence that sparked an outcry from rights groups around the world. This story clearly indicates the necessity to reform the Migration Service of Ukraine keeping the former attitude towards the political refugees, and demonstrates that concerted efforts and assertiveness of civil society actors are often able to conquer the old bureaucratic machine traditionally neglecting both human rights and human security.

Another category of persons experiencing enhanced risks to their security and very life, concerns some VIPs or well-known public figures

17. In contrast to refugee status, this term actually applies to "political refugees" – the notion absent in Ukraine's legislation.

18. See, for example, analysis by Refat Chubarov, 16.11.16 14:18: [http://censor.net.ua/news/415245/rossiya\\_zasypala\\_ukrainu\\_zaprosami\\_o\\_vydache\\_ee\\_grajdan\\_kotorye\\_pytayutsya\\_nayiti\\_zdes\\_ubejische\\_chubarov](http://censor.net.ua/news/415245/rossiya_zasypala_ukrainu_zaprosami_o_vydache_ee_grajdan_kotorye_pytayutsya_nayiti_zdes_ubejische_chubarov).

19. How can Ukraine claim it's safe to send opposition activists back to Russia? By Halya Coinash, 14.01.2016, <http://khrpg.org/en/index.php?id=1452720155>.

20. Seeking Asylum In Ukraine, Russian Dissidents Get Cold Shoulder. By Claire Bigg and Tetiana Iakubovych, January 20, 2016, <http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-russian-dissidents-find-no-asylum/27499333.html>.

## HUMAN SECURITY VS. NATIONAL SECURITY

becoming the targets of assassins and subjected to man-hunting, abduction or meeting death as a result of terrorist acts.

A few cases of protecting them successfully are known to wide public. One of them is the story of Ilia Bogdanov – former FSB officer who arrived in Ukraine coming from Russia in summer of 2014, and joined as a volunteer fighter first the 'Donbas' battalion, then the DUK 'Pravyi Sector'. Afterwards, he received Ukrainian citizenship, lived in Kyiv and disappeared on 12 November 2016. As it turned out, Bogdanov was kidnapped by a group of people and kept in isolation for further transfer to Russia. In a course of special operation worked out by the SBU, the criminals were detained at the Ukrainian-Russian border, and Bogdanov was liberated, as informed at a common briefing General Prosecutor of Ukraine and Head of the Security Service of Ukraine.<sup>21</sup>

Unfortunately, not all assassinations eventuated in such a happy end. Resonance murder of the prominent journalist Pavel Sheremet on 20 July 2016 resulted from the explosion of his car, and that crime remains yet unsolved despite all the endeavours of the Ukrainian investigators and engagement of the experts from the FBI and Europol.<sup>22</sup>

The most recent murder in the centre of Kyiv of Denis Voronenkov, former Russian State Duma deputy who in October 2016 left Russia and moved to Ukraine together with his wife – famous singer Maria Maksakova – was even more shocking. Very soon after arrival in Ukraine (on 6 December 2016) he was granted Ukrainian citizenship and was considered a witness of the extreme value for the prosecution and preparation of criminal case against the former president of Ukraine Victor Yanukovych and, assumedly, for sharing information about the possible links between Ukrainian 'Berkut' and Russian special services during

the Maidan events. On February 14, Russian FSB put him on a Federal 'Wanted' list; on March 23, he was killed by the assassin.

This tragedy has revealed, among many other repercussions, serious gaps and drawbacks in the system of ensuring the safety of key persons possessing information invaluable for state affairs. A number of questions arise, in particular, how was he found by his killers, and how was his safety secured. As prominent Ukrainian journalist and blogger Yuri Butusov wrote, "...after public announcements made by prosecutor's office officials, they should have offered security of a totally new level, with involvement of SBU or Interior Ministry, who are obliged by the law to ensure safety to persons involved in a criminal investigation". Butusov reached conclusion that "Voronenkov's assassination is the first blatant terrorist attack in Kyiv obviously orchestrated by the Russian secret services. We may see more attacks soon. It is necessary to investigate and draw conclusions out of it in order to prevent new casualties in this secret war."<sup>23</sup>

### Human security and social networks

New risk groups spread predominantly among teenagers appeared, rather unexpectedly, among active participants of popular Internet social networks, in particular, VKontakte. First and foremost, this threat relates to the so-called 'suicide groups' whose users, following a set of commands and instructions from their administrators, are led gradually to suicidal acts often eventuated by fatal casualties.<sup>24</sup> In Ukraine, over the last few months the cyber-police unit has blocked more than 500 'groups of death' in Internet, and arrested over 200 accounts of their organisers and 'curators'. As was stated during the briefing, this unit receives daily approximately 70 applications about children disappeared, and there are firm

21. See more: <http://news.bigmir.net/ukraine/1039700-SBU-osvobodila-pohichshennogo-eks-sotrudnika-FSB>.

22. See more: [http://censor.net.ua/news/431834/natspolitsiya\\_ne\\_isklyuchaet\\_versii\\_o\\_prichastnosti\\_k\\_ubiyistvu\\_sheremeta\\_boyitsov\\_natsgvardii\\_knyazev](http://censor.net.ua/news/431834/natspolitsiya_ne_isklyuchaet_versii_o_prichastnosti_k_ubiyistvu_sheremeta_boyitsov_natsgvardii_knyazev).

23. Denis Voronenkov was to meet his Moscow acquaintance, who left for Russia right after assassination. By Yuri Butusov, 05.04.17 14:24, [http://en.censor.net.ua/resonance/434710/denis\\_voronenkov\\_was\\_to\\_meet\\_his\\_moscow\\_acquaintance\\_who\\_left\\_for\\_russia\\_right\\_after\\_assassination](http://en.censor.net.ua/resonance/434710/denis_voronenkov_was_to_meet_his_moscow_acquaintance_who_left_for_russia_right_after_assassination).

24. See, for example: <https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2017/02/16/71537-sporim-na-lyam-chto-za-mnoy-nikto-ne-pridet-nikogda>.

evidence that 15-20% of the latter participated in the Internet 'traps'.<sup>25</sup> As has been emphasised, effective counteraction to this danger implies close collaboration of parents, teachers, and psychologists with law enforcement bodies. In addition, some professional psychologists warn about dangers linked to the people's need in security and sympathy, and sometimes detrimental effects caused by the involvement in discussions on the social networks often full of 'hate speech'.

### Conclusions

In Ukraine, an old-fashioned doctrine of 'state security above all' still has an upper hand over the rather new (especially for the 'post-Soviet space') notion of human security and the necessity to

develop a whole system of protection aimed at both individuals and vulnerable groups.

Current situation – in particular, annexation of the Crimean peninsula by the RF and continued war waged against local militants and Russian troops in Eastern Ukraine – presents new challenges complicating realisation of the ambitious plans in this direction. Nevertheless, the first steps are already being taken, whereas further success depends, *inter alia*, upon the active engagement of CSOs, and their regular collaboration with state bodies. International experience in counteracting terrorism and ensuring human security is also of great importance. In general, in all areas dealing with human security, tremendous consolidated work is still ahead.

---

25. See: [http://mvs.gov.ua/ru/news/6140\\_Pravoohraniteli\\_zablokirovani\\_bolee\\_500\\_tak\\_nazyvaemyh\\_grupp\\_smerti\\_i\\_bolee\\_200\\_ih\\_kuratorov\\_FOTO\\_VIDEO.htm](http://mvs.gov.ua/ru/news/6140_Pravoohraniteli_zablokirovani_bolee_500_tak_nazyvaemyh_grupp_smerti_i_bolee_200_ih_kuratorov_FOTO_VIDEO.htm).